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Abstract
The German conservative party (consisting of two sister parties)
planned in case of victory in the national election on 18 September
2005 to reduce the unemployment insurance contributions by 2 per-
cent and to nance this with an increase in the consumption tax by 2
percent. The present paper shows in a Layard-Nickell-Jackman type
wage bargaining model that this tax reform does not reduce unem-
ployment; neither in the short to medium run, nor in the long run.
When there is short-to-medium-run real wage resistance, then in the
short to medium run unemployment depends on the overall tax bur-
den, but not on the composition of the tax burden. In the long run the
wage setting curve is vertical and hence in the long run unemployment
is even invariant of the overall tax burden.
Keywords: Consumption taxes, unemployment insurance contri-
butions, payroll taxes. wage bargaining, unemployment.
JEL-classication: H20, J51.
1 Introduction
Germany is currently the sick man in Germany. Germanys unemployment
rate was with 9.2 in 2003 one of the highest in Europe and its growth rate of
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GDP was with 1.7 percent in 2003 one of the lowest in Europe.1 Not surpris-
ingly, the German social democrates (SPD), which are currently governing
Germany, lost in the German states one election after the other. In May
this year the social democrates lost even the state North Rhine-Westphalia,
which the social democrates had ruled for 39 years. After this defeat German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder decided in favour of an early national election
in 18 September this year, which was approved by the German parlament,
the German president Horst Köhler, and the German Federal Constitutional
Court this year. In the election campaign of the coming election Germanys
high unemployment rate is on the top of the agenda. In particular, the two
conservative sister parties in Germany (the CSU in Bavaria and the CDU in
the rest of Germany) gave a press conference on 11 July this year at which
they announced that they plan in case of victory in the election to reduce
in 2006 the unemployment insurance contributions by two percent and to
nance this with an increase in the consumption tax by two percent. This
revenue-neutral tax reform is considered to reduce unemployment. During
the last years repeatedly the high labour taxation in Germany and in partic-
ular the high social security contributions in Germany are blamed in various
political talk shows to be responsible for the high unemployment rate in Ger-
many. It is argued that a shift of taxation away from labour to consumption
could reduce the German unemployment problem.
In contrast to this common wisdom in Germany, the present paper ar-
gues that a substitution of consumption taxes for unemployment insurance
contributions does not reduce unemployment. To understand this paper, one
should note that in Germany employers and employees pay both half of the
unemployment insurance contributions. The starting point of the present pa-
pers view is the believe that European unemployment is the result of wage
bargaining in a Layard-Nickell-Jackman type of model, where bargaining re-
sults in a wage that is a markup over a reference wage. Since workers who do
not nd a job in their sector might be unemployed and receive unemployment
benets, the reference wage depends on the level of unemployment benets.
The present paper argues that there is short-to-medium-run real wage resis-
tance of unions in the form that in the short to medium run unions take the
reference wage as given and are not aware that unemployment benets are in-
dexed to the wage, as well as, that the alternative income of the unemployed
1See for the unemployment rate Gordon, (2005, Appendix B, Table B-4) and see CIA
World Factbook (2005) for the growth rate of GDP.
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depends on consumption taxes and unemployment insurance contributions
of employees, features which are all the case in Germany.2 Since the wage
income of the employed depends on consumption taxes and unemployment
insurance contributions of employees, changes of these two forms of taxes
change the wage income of the employed relative to the xed reference wage
and increase the wage pressure of unions. The paper shows that if only the
composition of the tax burden, but not the overall tax burden, changes, then
this increased wage pressure of unions exactly o¤sets the labour costs sav-
ings of rms from a reduction of the unemployment insurance contributions
of employers. This leaves the unemployment rate una¤ected. The overall tax
burden on labor is often referred as the tax wedge and is dened as the wedge
between producer and consumer wages. A substitution of consumption taxes
for unemployment insurance contributions changes the composition of the
tax wedge, but leaves the size of the tax wedge unchanged. The present
papers result that only the size of the tax wedge, but not the composition
of the tax wedge, matters is consistent with the view of Carlin and Soskice
(2005, ch. 4) and Layard et al. (1991).3 In fact, this paper can be seen as a
micro foundation of their views.
The present paper argues that in the long run, unemployment is even
invariant to the size of the tax wedge. The reason for this is the argument
that in the long run, unions should not take the reference wage as given.
Instead they should in the long run be aware of that unemployment benets
are indexed to the wage and that the alternative income of the unemployed
depends on consumption taxes and unemployment insurance contributions
of employees. This in turn implies that wage changes and tax changes do
not a¤ect the relation between the wage income of the employed and the al-
ternative income of the unemployed. The paper shows that this implies that
the unionspreferred employment is independ of the real wage. Technically,
this implies a vertical wage setting curve in a real wage/employment-graph,
where a wage setting curve is the combination of the real wage and employ-
ment that results from wage bargaining between unions and rms. The paper
shows that in case of a vertical wage setting curve changes of the tax wedge
2In Germany, rst the wage after taxes including social security contributions of em-
ployees is calculated and then unemployment benets are calculated as a xed fraction of
this net wage income.
3See also Sinn (2005). However, Sinn also argues that substituting consumption taxes
for unemployment insurance contributions improves the international competitiveness of
domestic rms slightly. The present paper does not conrm this claim.
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only a¤ect the real wage, but do not a¤ect the unemployment rate. This
long-run result is consistent with Layard et al. (1991). After the election the
German liberal party (FDP) planned to reduce the unemployment insurance
contributions by two percent as well (in 2007 instead of already in 2006).
But contrary to the conservative parties, it planned to nance this lower
contributions with reductions in manpower policies or other already existing
tax revenues. If it should be possible to reduce the unemployment insurance
contributions without an increase in consumption taxes, then, according to
the argument in the present paper, this would indeed lead to a reduction
of the unemployment rate in the short to medium run, as this policy would
reduce the tax wedge. However, the present paper shows that in the long-
run even this policy cannot reduce unemployment. Finally, the argument
of the present paper implies also that the plan of the conservative parties
to substitute consumption taxes for unemployment insurance contributions
reduces the value of existing wealth in prices of consumption goods by two
percent.4 Given the need to nance old age consumption with private savings
as Germany faces a pension crises in the near future, this is not good news
at all.
The results of the present paper are directly opposed to the result in
Püger (1997). In Püger substituting consumption taxes for payroll taxes
(of which unemployment insurance contributions of employers are a special
case) does reduce unemployment. He assumes that not only the wage income
of the employed depends on consumption taxes and unemployment insurance
contributions of employees, but also the alternative income of the unemployed
depends on these two forms of taxes. For this reason, in his model the
reference wage depends on these two forms of taxes, as well. For this reason,
on the one hand, changes of these two forms of taxes do not change the
wage income of the employed relative to the reference wage and do hence
not lead to a change of the wage pressure of unions. On the other hand, a
reduction of the unemployment insurance contributions of employers leads to
a reduction of rmslabour costs. As a consequence, the unemployment rate
falls. Püger assumes that unemployment benets are not indexed to wages,
although they are indexed to wages in Germany. For this reason, the model
does not imply a vertical wage setting curve in a real wage/employment-
graph, in which case the unemployment rate would be invariant to the tax
wedge. The assumption of unemployment benets that are not indexed to
4This conrms the argument of Sinn (2005).
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wages are justied in Michaelis and Püger (2000) with the argument that
empirical data show short-to-medium-run real wage resistance. The present
paper argues, however, that it is not very consistent that, on the one hand,
unions are in the short to medium run unaware of the fact that unemployment
benets are indexed to the wage, but are on the other hand rational enough
to understand the impact of tax changes on the alternative income of the
unemployed. Instead, this paper proposes to model unions to have in the
short to medium run a xed reference wage, which implies that in the short
to medium run unions are unaware of indexation of unemployment benets
to the wage and the impact of tax changes on the alternative income of the
unemployed, but understand in the long run completely that the alternative
income of the unemployed depends on the wage and on taxes. In turn,
this implies that substituting consumption taxes for unemployment insurance
contributions does not have an e¤ect on the unemployment rate; neither in
the short to medium run, nor in the long run.
Apart from Püger (1997), my paper is closely related to Fuest and Hu-
ber (2000) who also model short-to-medium-run real wage resistance di¤erent
from me. Picard and Toulemonde (2001) investigate the equivalence of taxes
paid by employers and employees in varous more general models than mine,
where my model is a special case of theirs (see also Creedy and McDonald,
1992, and Goerke, 1996). Goerke (2001) argues that in a unionised economy
with tax evasion the composition of the tax wedge between wage and payroll
taxes matters. Koskela and Schöb (1999) show that in a wage bargaining
model with progressive taxation the composition of the tax wedge between
wage and payroll taxes matters. Goerke (1999, 2000a, 2000b) investigates
in an e¢ ciency wage model under what conditions and in which direction
various changes of the composition of the tax wedge change unemployment.
Related work investigates in a wage bargaining model the e¤ect of a progres-
sive tax system to reduce wage pressure of unions and therefore to reduce
unemployment (see among others Lockwood and Manning, 1993, Fuest and
Huber, 1997, 2000, and Picard and Toulemonde, 2003).
2 The model
According to Layard et al. (1991, Ch. 2) long-run unemployment in Europe
is explained as the equilibrium unemployment rate that results at the point
of intersection of a price setting curve and a wage setting curve. The price
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setting curve is the labour demand curve of rms, which can set the prices
of their products due to imperfectly competitive product markets. The wage
setting curve is the combination of the real wage and employment that re-
sults from wage bargaining between rms and unions. In this framework
equilibrium unemployment is voluntary from the perspective of unions and
involuntary from the perspective of individual households (cf. Burda and
Wyplosz, 2005, p. 83). Each rms is real prot, i=P , is dened as
i
P
=
Ri
P
  Wi(1 + tP )Li
P
; (1)
where i are nominal prot of rm i, P is the aggregate price of domestic
products and Ri is the revenue of rm i dened as Ri = PiYi, where Pi
is the price of the product in sector i and Yi denotes output for product
i. In addition, Wi is the nominal wage in sector i, tP is the unemployment
insurance contribution rate of employers and Li is employment in sector i.
Consistent with the Germany case it is assumed that employers pay half of
the unemployment insurance contributions. Hence, the conservative parties
plan to reduce the unemployment insurance contributions by two percent
implies a reduction of tP by one percent. The production function of product
i is assumed to be
Yi = AiL

i ; with 0 <  < 1; (2)
where Ai is an index of technical e¢ ciency in producing product i. For sim-
plicity Ai is assumed to be constant. The assumption 0 <  < 1 ensures
a diminishing marginal product of labour which ensures a negatively sloped
price setting curve in a real wage/employment-graph. As shown in Appendix
A, the production function in (2) implies a constant wage elasticity of labour
demand. A constant wage elasticity of labour demand is crucial for this pa-
pers result. Adding capital to the production function would also imply a
constant wage elasticity of labour demand, provided one assumes a Cobb-
Douglas production function, which has an elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour that is equal to one. Various estimates from mainly indus-
trial sectors suggest a value of the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour below one (see Rowthorn, 1999). However, any model result that
depends on the assumption of an elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour below one is inconsistent with the stylised fact of a constant factor
share of labour in GDP. Because of this, most macroeconomists, including
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Layard et al. (2001), assume a production function with a constant wage
elasticity of labour demand.
Each rm faces the following demand for its product
Yi =

Pi
P
 
Y; (3)
where  represents the price elasticity for product i and Y denotes aggregate
domestic output. Rearranging (3) yields Pi = Y
 1

i;t Y
1
 . Substituting this
expression for Pi in the revenue denition Ri = PiYi gives Ri=P = Y itY
1
 ;
with   1  1

> 0. Substituting (2) in the latter expression leads to
Ri
P
= Ai L

i Y
1
 : (4)
Substituting (4) in (1) gives rise to the optimisation problem
max
Li
i
P
= Ai L

i Y
1

t  
Wi(1 + tP )Li
P
; (5)
Di¤erentiation of i=P with respect to Li, using (4) and substituting (2)
yields the monoploy pricing rule

1  1


Pi = (Ai)
 1Wi(1 + tP )L1 i
or Pi = (Ai)
 1Wi(1 + tP )L1 i (6)
Finally, rearranging (6) and aggregating gives the aggregate price setting
equation as
w  W
P
=

1
1 + tp

AL 1: (7)
Following the WebAppendix of Burda and Wyplosz (2005), available at
www.oup.com/uk/booksites/content/0199264961/student/appendix/wa12.pdf
and extended to an open economy, each union is assumed to have the follow-
ing Stone-Geary utility funtion
Vi =

Wi
P [(1  ) + ] (1 + tC)  
W
 
Li   L
	1 
; (8)
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where Vi denotes each unions utility,  is the share of imports in expenditures
of domestic consumers,   P e=P is the real exchange rate (with P  denot-
ing the aggregate price of imports in foreign currency and e denoting the nom-
inal exchange rate) and tC denotes the consumption tax rate. The term in the
denominator is the domestic price level PC , where use was made of factoring
out, so that PC = [(1  )P + (P e)] (1 + tC) = P [(1  ) + ] (1 + tC).
Further, Li denotes employment in sector i, W and L denote each unions
reference levels of the wage and employment,  is a constant and time indexes
are omitted. A positive value of L ensures in a real wage/employment-graph
a positively sloped wage setting curve for given value of W .
Following Layard (1991) I assume a right-to-manage model in which
unions and rms bargain over the wage and, once the wage is chosen, rms
choose employment. The qualitative results would be the same in a monopoly
union model, but since Layard (1991) use a right-to-manage model and this
model has the monopoly union model as a special case, the present paper
uses a right-to-manage model. In this model unions and rms in sector i
choose the real wage that maximises the Nash product 
i:

i =  lnVi + (1  ) lni=P; (9)
where  measures the bargaining power of unions. If  = 1, we would get
exactly the same result as in a monopoly union model. In Appendix B it is
shown that the bargaining optimisation problem gives after aggregating the
aggregate wage setting equation as
w  W
P
=

[(1  ) + ] (1 + tC)
1  tI



W; (10)
with  
 (1  ) + (1  )

1  L
L

 (1  ) + (1  )

1  L
L

   (1  )

1  L
L
 ;
where the expression between curly brackets is the markup of the wage over
the reference wage W . The expression between curly brackets is independent
of the unemployment insurance contributions of employers. This is due to
the assumption of a constant wage elasticity of labour demand. Holmlund
(1989) has shown that in a model with a production function with capital and
labour and an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour di¤erent
from one, which implies a non-constant wage elasticity of labour demand,
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the wage setting equation depends on payroll taxes (of which unemployment
insurance contributions of employers are a special case). However, as dis-
cussed before, only a constant wage elasticity of labour demand is consistent
with the stylised fact of a constant factor share of labour in GDP.
Figure 1 shows the real wage in prices of domestic goods w = W=P
on the vertical axis and employment L on the horizontal axis. Due to a
diminishing marginal product of labour as employment expands the price
setting curve (PS) is negatively sloped. Due to the assumption of a Stone-
Geary utility function of unions, there is a positively sloped wage setting
curve (WS), provided L > 0. When drawing the wage setting curve, it was
assumed that there is short-to-medium-run real wage resistance in the form
that unions take in the short to medium run the reference wage W as given,
as was motivated in the introduction.5 Finally, there is a labour supply curve
(LS) respresenting the labour force at a given real wage and for simplicity
assumed to be vertical. In the gure, the equilibrium real wage w1 and the
equilibrium employment level L are determined by the point of intersection
of the price setting curve PS1 and the wage setting curve WS1. There is
equilibrium unemployment due to the markup of the real wage over the
reference wage W . The equilibrium unemployment U equals the di¤erence
between equilibrium employment L and labour supply N.
From (7) follows that a reduction of the unemployment insurance contri-
butions of employers by one percent leads to an upwards shifts of the price
setting curve to PS2. From (10) follows that an increase of the consumption
tax by two percent together with a reduction of the unemployment insurance
contributions of employees by one percent leads to an upwards shifts of the
wage setting curve toWS2. Since there is only a change of the composition of
the tax wedge both curves shift up by the same amount.6 This leaves unem-
5A richer framework would assume that in the short to medium run W is a moving
averages of past labour costs and tax rates (see Layard et al., 1991, p. 109). In such a
framework unions would slowly learn about changes in tax rates. While this would show an
economys transition from a short-to-medium-run equilibrium to a long-run equilibrium,
the present paper abstracts from these complications for simplicity. Note also that I
assumed for simplicity absence of technical progress.
6One could add an unemployment insurance budget constraint to the model to calcu-
late the increase in the consumption tax rate necessary to nance the reduction in the
unemployment insurance contributions. Instead, this paper believes the calculations of
the conservative parties that an increase of consumption taxes by two percent is required
to nance the reduction of the unemployment insurance contributions by the same percent
rate.
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Figure 1: Employment e¤ect of a substitution of consumption taxes for un-
employment insurance contributions
ployment una¤ected. What actually happens is that in the new equilibrium
the nominal wage W is increased by one percent as, due to the reduction
of the unemployment insurance contributions of employers by one percent,
rms can a¤ord this increase of the nominal wage W . The purchasing power
of workers is unchanged because the increase of the nominal wage is o¤set
by the net e¤ect of an increase of the consumption tax by two percent and
a reduction of the unemployment insurance contributions of employees by
one percent. Further, labour costs of rms are also unchanged because the
reduction of the unemployment insurance contributions of employers by one
percent is o¤set by the increase of the nominal wage nominal wage by one
percent. This in turn implies that the price of domestic products and there-
fore the international competitiveness of domestic rms does not improve
from the tax reform, contrary to a claim by the conservative parties and the
media.
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In the long run unions should not take the reference wage W as given.
Instead, in the long run the reference wage should equal the real income in
consumer prices that workers receive if they cannot nd a job in their sector.
I assume for simplicity that, due to sector-specic skills, workers in sector i
cannot move to a job in another sector. Therefore, a worker is unemployed,
if he cannot nd a job in his sector. Under this assumption and assuming
consistent with the German case that unemployment benets are a xed
proportion b of the net wage, the reference wage W becomes in the long run
W =
bW (1  tI)
P [(1  ) + ] (1 + tC) : (11)
Substituting (11) in (10) yields
w  W
P
= b
W
P
: (12)
Since W=P cancels out in (12), the long run wage setting curve (LRWS)
in Figure 1 is vertical. Substituting the denition of  in (10) in (12) and
solving for employment gives
L = $L; (13)
$  (1  )  (1  b)(1  )
(1  )  (1  b)(1  )  (1  b)(1  ) ;
where $ is the markup of long-run employment over the reference employ-
ment level L: The markup $ is independent of the consumption tax rate and
the unemployment insurance contribution rate of employees. As can be seen
from Figure 1, in long run unemployment would even remain una¤ected from
a reduction in the unemployment insurance contribution rate that is not -
nanced by an increase of the consumption tax. In addition, Figure 1 shows
that, due to an upwards shift of the price setting curve, also in the long run a
reduction of the unemployment insurance contributions of employers by one
percent leads to an increase of the nominal wage by one percent, leaving the
price of domestic products and therefore the international competitiveness
of domestic rms unchanged. However, an increase of the consumption tax
by two percent reduces the value of existing wealth in prices of consumption
goods by two percent. This is certainly not good news for private savers for
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old age consumption. In contrast, with no increase in the consumption tax
rate this drop of the value of existing wealth in prices of consumption goods
can be avoided.
As mentioned in the introduction, the result of the present paper is di-
rectly opposed to the result of Püger (1997), who nds an e¤ect from sub-
stituting consumption taxes for payroll taxes. Why is this so? This is so,
because Püger assumes the reference wage to be7
W =
B(1  tI)
P [(1  ) + ] (1 + tC) ; (14)
where B are the unemployment benets. Substituting (14) in (10) gives
w  W
P
= 
B
P
; (15)
where the wage setting curve is positively sloped because  depends in (10)
on L: Since neither consumption taxes nor unemployment insurance con-
tributions of employees appear in (15), substituting consumption taxes for
unemployment insurance contributions do, on the one hand, not leads to an
upwards shifts of the wage setting curve. On the other hand, a reduction of
the unemployment insurance contributions of employers by one percent still
leads to an upwards shifts of the price setting curve to PS2. Hence, in the
new equilibrium in Figure 1 employment is increased to L2. What happens
here is that the wage setting curve is independent of consumption taxes and
unemployment insurance contributions of employees because not only the
wage income of the employed depends on these two forms of taxes, but
also the alternative income of the unemployed depends on these two forms
of taxes. Therefore, these two forms of taxes cancel out in (15). In contrast,
unemployment insurance contributions of employers do neither a¤ect the
wage income of the employed, nor the alternative income of the unemployed.
Hence, while a reduction of the unemployment insurance contributions of
employers shifts the price setting curve upwards, this is not o¤set by a shift
of the wage setting curve by the same amount.
My objection to the latter framwork is, however, that in (14) the unem-
ployment benets are not indexed to the wage, although in practice they are
7Püger actually assumes that workers who cannot nd a job in their sector can possibly
nd a job in another sector. For simplicity, but without loss in generality, I abstract from
this possibility in (14).
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indexed to it in Germany. Michaelis and Püger (2000) justify such an as-
sumption with the argument that empirical data show short-to-medium-run
real wage resistance. While true, it was argued before that short-to-medium-
run real wage resistance is better modelled with a xed reference wage W .
This is so, because (14) has the not very consistent implication that, on the
one hand, unions are in the short to medium run unaware of the fact that
unemployment benets are indexed to the wage, but are on the other hand
rational enough to understand the impact of tax changes on the alternative
income of the unemployed. The present paper argues that it is more consis-
tent that unions are in the short to medium run unaware of indexation of
unemployment benets to the wage, as well as, of the impact of tax changes
on the alternative income of the unemployed and understand both factors
completely in the long run, as was modelled in the present paper.8
8In Germany unemployment benets of unemployed, who are longer than one year
unemployed, is not indexed to the net wage. However, long-term unemployment seem
not to a¤ect the wage bargaining process, as unions seem to view long-term unemployed
as having in e¤ect withdrawn from participation in the labour market, because potential
employers see long-term unemployed as less attractive for employment than short-term
unemployed (see, e.g., Carlin and Soskice, 2005, Ch. 4).
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Appendix A: Derivation of the wage elasticity of labour
demand
Optimisation problem (5) yields
@i
@Li
= Ai L
 1
i Y
1
   Wi(1 + tp)
P
= 0 (16)
Collecting terms in (16) gives
Li =
(
Ai 

Wi(1 + tp)
P
 1
Y
1

) 1
1 
: (17)
(17) implies the constant wage elasticity of labour demand
@Li
@Wi
Wi
Li
=   1
1  : (18)
Appendix B: Derivation of rst order condition of the
wage bargaining optimisation problem
The wage bargaining optimisation problem in the text (i.e. maximization
of (9)gives the rst order condition
d
i
dWi
= 

@Vi
@Wi
1
Vi

+ (1  )

@i=P
@Wi
1
i=P

= 0: (19)
Using the unions utility function (8), the real prot denition (5), noting
that in the optimization problem @Luit=@wuit 6= 0, using (18) in Appendix A
and Hotellings lemma d(i=P )=dWi =   (1 + tP ) (Li) gives
d
i
dWi
= 

1  tI
Wi (1  tI)  P [(1  ) + ] (1 + tC) W

(20)
+(1  )
 
1
1  L
Li
!
@Li
@Wi
1
Li
  (1  )(1  tp)Li
i
= 0.
After many rearrangements of (8) and aggregating one nally ends up with
(10) in the text.
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